We examine the e¤ects of trade liberalization in environmental goods in a model with one domestic downstream polluting …rm and two upstream …rms (one domestic, one foreign). The upstream …rms o¤er their technologies to the downstream …rm at a ‡at fee. The domestic government sets the emission tax rate after the outcome of R&D is known. The e¤ect of liberalization on the domestic upstream …rm's R&D incentive is ambiguous. Liberalization usually results in cleaner production, which allows the country to reach higher welfare. However this increase in welfare is typically achieved at the expense of the environment (a back…re e¤ect).
Introduction
While trade liberalization of past sixty years has brought great economic growth, recent research suggests it may have harmed the environment. 1 In this paper, we examine the e¤ect of trade liberalization in environmental goods and services (EGS) on a country's EGS sector, 2 its welfare and its environmental quality. Our analysis is especially relevant for developing countries where the demand for EGS is fast expanding, while the domestic sector is still immature 3 and trade 1 Antweiler et al. (2001) …nd that trade liberalization has generally reduced SO 2 concentrations. Cole and Elliott (2003) suggest it will reduce BOD, but increase CO 2 and NO x emissions. Managi et al. (2009) conclude that trade has bene…ted the environment in OECD countries, but increased SO 2 and CO 2 emissions elsewhere. Lovely and Popp (2011) empirically examine two e¤ects of trade openness: While it improves access to the latest clean technologies, it also reduces industry's ability to pass on regulatory costs to consumers. 2 See Sinclair-Desgagné (2008) for a description of the global eco-industry. 3 OECD (2005) predicts that the EGS market will grow by less than 1% annually in developed countries and by 8.6% in the developing countries, while Sinclair-Desgagné (2008) predicts growth …gures of 3-5% and 10-15% respectively. In 2003 nearly 80% of the global exports of EGS originated in developed countries (Hamwey, 2005) . barriers for EGS are relatively high (OECD, 2005; De Melo and Vijil, 2014 ).
We will model EGS as integrated technologies, reducing the emission-to-output ratio of production. 4 We consider an industry where the downstream good's production is polluting and the upstream industry is engaged in R&D to develop a cleaner technology which it can licence to the downstream …rm. The upstream …rm faces competition from a foreign …rm after trade liberalization.
We …nd that the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the incentive for domestic …rm to do R&D is ambiguous. Trade liberalization usually leads to the availability of cleaner technologies and higher welfare. However, this increase in welfare comes at the expense of the environment. 5 The government responds to the opportunity for cleaner production by allowing more production, to the point where total pollution increases. Borrowing a term from the energy economics literature (Saunders, 2000) , the availability of a cleaner technology causes a back…re e¤ect. Thus we cast doubt on the "win-win-win" outcome that the WTO and OECD hope for: there seems to be a "win" both for welfare and trade, but not for environmental quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature. After describing the model in Section 3, we solve the game by backwards induction. In Section 4 we analyze how the upstream …rms set their technology fees under di¤erent possible R&D outcomes. In Section 5, we look at government policy under free trade and autarky. Section 6 discusses the R&D decisions of the …rms. In Section 7, we compare expected welfare and environmental damage under autarky and free trade. Section 8 concludes.
Literature review
The literature on innovation and adoption of new abatement technology, reviewed by Ja¤e et al. (2003) and Requate (2005a) , has mostly assumed that if a polluting …rm wants to install a new abatement technology, it has to pay a certain installation or (possibly) R&D cost itself. Some authors take into account that one …rm can license its invention to other …rms. In the papers by Milliman and Prince (1989), Biglaiser and Horowitz (1995), Fischer et al. (2003) , the innovator is one of the polluting …rms. In other papers, which we will discuss here, there are specialized …rms (the eco-industry) that licence their innovations or sell their products to the polluting industry. 6 Parry (1995, 1998) sets up a model with free entry into the eco-industry. The probability that a given …rm will …nd (and obtain a patent for) the new technology is decreasing in the number of eco-…rms. Parry (1995) argues that when the government sets the emission tax rate before the eco-…rms'entry decision, the tax rate will usually be below marginal damage. Parry (1998) compares emission taxes, tradable emission permits and relative standards, but only at their respective Pigouvian levels. This is to counter monopoly pricing by the innovator, excessive entry into the eco-industry and the excess of innovator revenue over social bene…ts. In the same vein, David et al.
(2011) …nd that although raising the emission tax rate induces new abatement suppliers to enter the market, it might not increase abatement e¤orts. This is because with the stringent tax, the demand for the abatement goods becomes more price inelastic leading to eco-…rms reducing their output. La¤ont and Tirole (1996) argue that the monopolistic innovator will set a licence fee that slightly undercuts the permit price set by the regulator. If the regulator sets the permit price after R&D, she will set it equal to zero in order to obtain complete di¤usion of the clean technology. As a result, the innovator's licence fee income will be zero, so that he will not invest in R&D. Although the timing of our game is similar to La¤ont and Tirole's (1996), we do not encounter the problem of incomplete di¤usion, because there is only one …rm to which the innovators license their technology.
Requate (2005b) models a monopolistic eco-…rm's R&D and licensing fee decisions for a number of timing and commitment regimes. Environmental policy (the tax rate or the number of tradable permits issued) is either set after the downstream …rms' adoption decisions, after observing R&D success but before adoption, or before R&D, where it could be contingent on or independent of R&D success. The author …nds that 6 All papers discussed here assume welfare-maximizing governments. See Canton (2008) for a political-economy model with the eco-industry in an international setting. commitment to a menu of tax rates dominates all other policy regimes. In our paper, we only model environmental taxation set after observing R&D success but before adoption. We expand Requate's (2005b) model by including the downstream product market and competition between a domestic and a foreign eco-…rm. Perino (2010) includes the output market for the downstream industry and …nds that optimal emissions, as well as emissions under tradable permits, can be decreasing in the cost of abatement. We …nd a similar result with a di¤erent model: Expected pollution rises when international trade results in the availability of cleaner technology.
We now turn to the literature on the eco-industry and international trade. All the papers we discuss here (unlike our own paper) model the eco-industry's product as an end-of-pipe technology, equivalent to an input into production, in the sense that the more the downstream …rm uses of it, the lower its emissions. These papers usually do not consider the eco-industry's R&D incentives. Our paper, on the other hand, assumes that the eco-industry provides an integrated abatement technology (reducing emissions per unit of output), which the downstream …rm can either use (against a fee)
or not use, and we analyze the eco-industry's R&D incentives. Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) consider an international Cournot duopoly with an eco-…rm in the home country. Unlike in our model, Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) assume that the price of its product is exogenously given. The authors …nd that if the eco-…rm bene…ts from a higher tax rate, the home goverment will set a higher tax rate than the foreign government. However, the home government may lower its tax rate when there is learning by doing. Greaker (2006) shows how a country can increase the export market share of its (perfectly competitive) polluting industry by committing to a low level of allowed emissions per …rm. This is because the stricter environmental policy leads more …rms to pay the initial R&D cost to enter the eco-industry. This increased competition in the eco-industry lowers the price of the environmental good.
Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) employ a two-country model with an eco-…rm in each country, supplying the perfectly competitive polluting industries in both countries.
The authors …nd that a more stringent environmental policy is good for the domestic polluting industry, because it reduces the price of abatement equipment. However, the increase in demand from the domestic polluting industry may bene…t the foreign eco-…rm at the expense of the domestic eco-…rm.
In a framework similar to Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) but with a monopolistic Northern eco-…rm, Nimubona (2012) shows that an import tari¤ on EGS helps the Southern government extract rents from the eco-…rm. An exogenous decrease in the tari¤ leads to a lower emission tax in the South if the South cannot fully extract the eco-…rm's rents. While EGS imports rise, the decrease in the tax rate results in higher production, so that pollution may actually increase. Like Nimubona (2012), we …nd that trade liberalization usually increases the expected cleanliness of production, but when it does, it also increases pollution. However, our model is quite di¤erent in that we model EGS as an integrated technology rather than end-of-pipe, we assume there is a Southern eco-…rm that can undertake R&D, and we model trade liberalization as a discrete jump from autarky to completely free trade rather than a marginal reduction in the tari¤.
The model
We consider the market for a consumption good, for which domestic demand is given by P = A q, with P the product price, q production and A > 0. For simplicity, we assume there is only one domestic producer of the good (the downstream …rm), 7 with constant marginal cost of production c: We will normalize A c = 1; so that:
For simplicity, we assume that there is no international trade in this good. Production of the good is polluting. Environmental damage of emissions E is:
The abatement technologies d; h; f; n that the downstream …rm might use are integrated technologies that result in a certain emissions-to-output ratio e = E=q. Tech- 7 If there were multiple downstream …rms, we would have to consider the upstream …rms'incentives to increase revenue by licencing to a limited number of …rms at a higher fee. nology d is the technology that the downstream …rm itself has developed. We normalize the emission-to-output ratio e d of this technology to one. The other technologies are owned by the upstream …rms. The downstream …rm can use them for a ‡at fee F .
The domestic (foreign) upstream …rm has abatement technology h (f ) available; with e f < e h < 1; i.e. the foreign upstream …rm's technology is cleaner than the domestic upstream …rm's, and both are cleaner than the downstream …rm's own technology.
We can interpret this as the downstream …rm having made an imperfect imitation of the upstream …rms'abatement technologies (Parry, 1995 (Parry, , 1998 ).
Both upstream …rms can do R&D into a new technology n with e n < e f . Firm j's (j = h; f ) cost of R&D is C j ; with:
and its probability of …nding the new technology is p j (p Each technology consists of know-how and possibly also abatement equipment. The equipment for technology i can only be built by the …rm supplying the technology, at cost K i . We shall assume:
The foreign upstream …rm can also licence its technology i = f; n abroad, earning net revenue (fees minus production costs) of R i ; with R n > R f > 0: We assume that the domestic upstream …rm does not have the expertise to licence its technology abroad.
Environmental policy consists of an emission tax. The domestic government sets the tax rate t at the level that maximizes domestic welfare.
We compare the regimes of autarky and free trade. With autarky, tari¤ and/or non-tari¤ barriers are so high that it is impossible or not pro…table for the foreign upstream …rm to o¤er its technology to the domestic downstream …rm. With free trade, there are no barriers for the foreign upstream …rm. The game under autarky is as follows: 8 If K i = 0; technology i is a blueprint that requires no equipment.
1. The domestic upstream …rm decides whether or not to do R&D, and the outcome of R&D is observed.
2. The domestic government sets the emission tax rate.
3. The domestic upstream and downstream …rms bargain over the fee for the upstream …rm's technology.
4. The domestic upstream …rm builds the equipment. The downstream …rm sets its output level.
The game under free trade is:
1. The domestic and foreign upstream …rms decide whether or not to do R&D, and the outcome of R&D is observed.
3. The domestic and foreign upstream …rms set their technology fees.
4. The downstream …rm decides which abatement technology. The winning upstream …rm builds the equipment. The downstream …rm sets its output level.
We will solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the two games.
Licence fee and output decisions
In this section, we will solve for stages 3 and 4 of the game, introducing some constraints we will have to impose on the parameters.
Using backwards induction, we start the analysis in stage 4. For stages 2 to 4, the superscript s denotes the di¤erent scenarios; according to the technologies that are available. We will de…ne the scenarios at the end of this section. The subscript i denotes the technology that the downstream …rm uses. The downstream …rm's pro…t gross of the licence fee (and its own building cost K d if applicable) in scenario s with technology i is, from (1):
Di¤erentiating (5) and solving for the pro…t-maximizing quantity q s i yields:
Substituting (6) into (5), we …nd the gross pro…t of the downstream …rm as:
Moving on to stage 3, denote the upstream …rm with the most (least) e¢ cient technology e 1 (e 2 ) by …rm 1 (2), i.e. e 1 e 2 .
9
In autarky, the domestic upstream …rm is always …rm 1 and the downstream …rm is …rm 2. We model the game between the two …rms to determine the fee F s as Nash bargaining where the upstream …rm has bargaining power~ 2 (0; 1]: The outside payo¤s are zero for the upstream …rm and
We shall assume that the downstream …rm has a positive outside payo¤, but it would prefer the domestic upstream …rm's technology if the fee equalled the equipment building cost:
The Nash bargaining problem is then:
The …rst order condition is:
Solving for F s yields:
where the inequality follows from (8). 9 In order to avoid complications with corner solutions, we wish to restrict our parameters such that q With free trade, …rms 1 and 2 are the upstream …rms. They engage in price competition to sell their technology to the downstream …rm. 10 In the Nash equilibrium, …rm 2's fee will exactly cover its production cost K 2 , while …rm 1 charges a fee of:
with s i ; i = 1; 2; given by (7) . The inequality follows from (4) and (7) with e 1 e 2 . Strictly speaking, the downstream …rm is then indi¤erent between the technologies o¤ered by the two …rms. We assume that the downstream …rm will choose …rm 1's technology. This is because …rm 1 could always charge slightly less than F s in (10) to make the downstream …rm prefer its technology.
The net pro…t s of the downstream …rm (net of the licence fee for the e¢ cient technology) is then, from (9) and (10):
with s i ; i = 1; 2; given by (7) and =~ (1) for autarky (free trade). Firm 1's net fee (net of production cost) is:
We show in Appendix B that the licence fee is …rst increasing and then decreasing in the quality of the superior technology: From (6), (7) and (10):
An improvement in the best technology (a decrease in e 1 ) has two e¤ects on the licence fee. Firstly, for a given tax rate, it increases the pro…ts the downstream …rm can obtain and thus raises the fee. This is the …rst term on the RHS of (13) . Secondly, the tax rate changes, with the e¤ect on F s given by the second term on the RHS of (13),
Initially, the tax rate might increase as the technology gets better. This would cause a further increase in the fee. However, eventually the tax rate will start to decline, which has a negative e¤ect on the fee. Eventually, the second e¤ect dominates as the tax rate and the fee decline to zero.
We restrict our analysis to a level of abatement technology such that the licence fee is decreasing in e 1 : dF
If instead dF s =de 1 > 0; the upstream …rm would realize that it could gain a higher fee with a worse technology. This would give the …rm an incentive to tinker with or sabotage the technology, increasing its e 1 and gaining a higher licence fee. We discuss the conditions for (14) to hold in Appendix B.
Finally, let us de…ne the scenarios. In autarky, the scenarios are nd and hd when the domestic upstream …rm has and has not found the new technology n respectively.
In both scenarios, the downstream …rm chooses to use the domestic upstream …rm's technology. With free trade, the scenarios with their equilibrium outcomes are:
f h : Neither the domestic nor the foreign …rm has found the new technology.
Then the foreign …rm will supply technology f to the downstream …rm.
nh : Only the foreign …rm has found the new technology. The foreign …rm will supply n to the downstream …rm.
nf : Only the domestic …rm has found the new technology. The domestic …rm will supply n to the downstream …rm.
nn : Both …rms have found the new technology. They compete the fee down to K n . The domestic …rm is indi¤erent between the two upstream …rms'o¤ers.
Government Policy
In stage two of the game, the goverment sets the emission tax rate that maximizes domestic welfare W s in scenario s; given that the domestic …rm uses the most e¢ cient technology e 1 . Social welfare is the sum of the domestic upstream and downstream …rms'pro…ts, consumer surplus and tax revenues, minus environmental damage (2):
where is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0) when the domestic (foreign) upstream …rm supplies the abatement technology.
When e 1 is high, the government will want to set a positive tax rate in order to reduce pollution. When e 1 is low, the government would like to set a negative tax rate in order to correct for under-production by the monopolist downstream …rm. In our analysis, we will exclude from our analysis values of e 1 so low that t becomes negative.
Indeed, as we have announced in Section 4, we will even exclude higher e 1 values for which t is positive, but the licence fee is increasing in e 1 :
With the emissions-to-output ratio given, welfare only depends on q s 1 if the domestic …rm supplies the technology. In that case, the government can reach the …rst best with the single instrument of the emission tax. There would be no welfare gain from using another instrument such as an output subsidy. If the foreign …rm supplies the technology, welfare depends on q s 2 as well as on q s 1 and the government would gain from having another instrument (such as an output subsidy) available. However, since output subsidies are less commonly applied in manufacturing industries, we shall limit our analysis to the single instrument of an emission tax.
Autarky
Denote the domestic upstream …rm's technology in stage 3 by i; i = h; n: With e 1 = e i ; id + F id h = id i by (11) . Substituting this, (6) and (7) into (15), social welfare in scenario id is given by:
Di¤erentiating and solving for t id yields:
The tax rate is positive if and only if:
Substituting (17) into (6), we …nd the equilibrium output level q id i and the output level q id 0 that the downstream …rm would choose using its own abatement technology:
Substituting this and (7) into (10), we obtain the technology fee as:
Free Trade

Domestic …rm has found the new technology
In scenarios ng; g = f; n; the domestic upstream …rm supplies the technology. 11 Substituting e 1 = e n ; e 2 = e k and ng + F ng h = ng n by (11), along with (6) and (7) into (15), social welfare in scenario ng is:
Di¤erentiating and solving for t ng yields:
Substituting this into (6), we obtain the equilibrium outputs as:
For scenario nf; substituting (22) into (6), we …nd the equilibrium output of the downstream …rm when it uses the less e¢ cient technology f :
e f e 2 n + e n + e f 2e n ( e 2 n + 1)
Substituting (7), (23) and (24) into (10), the domestic eco-…rm's licence fee is:
For scenario nn; we have F nn h = K n .
Domestic …rm has not found the new technology
In scenarios jh; j = f; n, the foreign …rm supplies the technology to the downstream …rm. Substituting e 1 = e j ; e 2 = e h ; F jh h = 0 and jh = jh h (by (11)) along with (6) and (7) into (15), social welfare in scenario jh is: 27) The denominator on the RHS is positive, because it is the second order condition for welfare maximization. Thus t jh > 0 holds in the welfare optimum if and only if:
Substituting (27) into (6), we obtain the equilibrium output level q Substituting this and (7) into (10), we …nd the foreign …rm's technology fee:
R&D decisions
In this section we solve for stage one of the game under autarky (subsection 6.1) and free trade (subsection 6.2) and we compare the domestic …rm's R&D incentives under both regimes (subsection 6.3).
Autarky
In autarky, the domestic …rm will undertake R&D if its expected payo¤ from undertaking R&D exceeds its payo¤ from not doing R&D: 
given by (30) with j = f; n:
with R s given by (12) and F id h ; i = n; h; given by (20) . Thus the …rm will do R&D if and only if:
6.2 Free trade Table 1 shows the payo¤ matrix for the domestic and foreign upstream …rms in stage one, depending on either …rm's decision whether or not to do R&D. The …rst (second) term in each cell shows the payo¤ to the domestic (foreign) …rm.
Let us …rst look at the foreign …rm's incentive to do R&D. In case the domestic …rm does R&D, the foreign …rm will undertake R&D when:
In case the domestic …rm does not do R&D, the foreign …rm will do R&D when:
It is easily seen from (32) and (33) that when the domestic …rm does R&D, the critical R&D cost level for the foreign …rm is lower:
The reason for this is that without domestic R&D, the foreign …rm can always increase its net revenues from R does not …nd the new technology. In case the domestic …rm …nds the new technology, the foreign …rm does not earn any revenues, whether it is successful itself (then the fee is competed down to K n ) or not (then the domestic …rm's technology is better). Now we turn to the domestic upstream …rm's incentive to do R&D. If the foreign …rm does R&D, the domestic …rm will undertake R&D when C h < C h 2 or from (3):
In case the foreign …rm does not do R&D, the domestic …rm undertakes R&D for
It is easily seen from (35) and (36) that for the domestic …rm as well, its critical R&D cost level is lower if the rival …rm does R&D:
The reason is analogous to the reason behind inequality (34).
There will be an (R&D, No R&D)
In order to avoid the indeterminacy and complication of multiple equilibria, we have to assume either C
We shall assume the former, because the conditions for it to hold are less stringent:
This inequality requires relatively few extra constraints, because p 
The Nash equilibrium is then (R&D, R&D) if 
Domestic …rm' s R&D incentive
The domestic …rm will do R&D in autarky if and only if C h < C 
The inequality is more likely to hold for:
Low~ : By (12) and (20), the lower the domestic upstream …rm's bargaining power~ vis-a-vis the downstream …rm in autarky, the lower its fees and the lower the increase in its fee from …nding the new technology in autarky.
Low e h ; because R hd h is decreasing in e h by (12) and (14): The better the domestic …rm's existing technology, the higher the fee it will obtain for e h in autarky and therefore the lower the R&D incentive under autarky.
Low p
f : The lower p f ; the higher the probability that the foreign …rm fails to …nd the new technology, allowing the domestic …rm to earn positive net revenue from the new technology (if it …nds it) under free trade.
High e f ; because by (12) and (25), R nf h is increasing in e f : The worse the foreign …rm's existing technology, the higher the licence fee the domestic …rm can obtain if it …nds the new technology and the foreign …rm does not, and therefore the higher the domestic …rm's R&D incentive under free trade. 
Not only can C
Comparing autarky and free trade
In this section, we compare the autarky and free trade equilibria with respect to expected welfare and expected environmental damage. For welfare, we …nd: 14 Proposition 1 Expected welfare is higher with free trade than in autarky for any combination of equilibria, except when the domestic upstream …rm undertakes R&D in autarky and:
1. neither …rm undertakes R&D with free trade. In this case, expected welfare is higher with free trade if and only if the domestic upstream …rm's success probability p h of R&D satis…es:
2. only the foreign …rm undertakes R&D with free trade. In this case, expected welfare is higher with free trade if:
We see that the domestic country is better o¤ with free trade in almost all equilibria where trade liberalization makes cleaner technologies available (or raises the probability of acquiring cleaner technologies). This is true even though the fee for using these cleaner technogies may well have to be paid to the foreign upstream …rm. The reason is that the fee equals the domestic downstream …rm's change in pro…ts, which is su¢ ciently close to the change in welfare for the whole economy.
Turning to environmental damage, we …nd: 14 The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are in Appendix C.
Proposition 2 Expected environmental damage is higher with free trade than in autarky for any combination of equilibria, except when the domestic upstream …rm undertakes R&D in autarky and:
1. neither …rm undertakes R&D with free trade. In this case, expected environmental damage is higher with free trade if and only if the domestic upstream …rm's success probability p h of R&D satis…es:
2. only the foreign …rm undertakes R&D with free trade. In this case, expected welfare is higher with free trade if and only if the domestic upstream …rm's cost C h of R&D satis…es:
Paradoxically, in almost all equilibria where trade liberalization leads to a cleaner technology becoming available (or raises the probability of acquiring cleaner technologies), expected environmental damage is unambiguously higher under free trade. This is because the government takes this opportunity of cleaner production to increase welfare at the expense of the environment by reducing the e¤ective tax rate te 1 on output, prompting the …rm to produce more and ultimately even to pollute more.
The result is similar to the rebound (Khazzoom, 1980) and back…re e¤ects (Saunders, 2000) in energy economics, where the introduction of a more energy-e¢ cient technology (e.g. a more economical car engine) leads to an increase in demand which partly (rebound) or more than completely (back…re) o¤sets the potential energy saving.
Empirically, the rebound e¤ect is generally between 5 and 50% (Binswanger, 2001 ), but available, but it will increase energy use and CO 2 emissions because of an increase in overall production and a shift to more energy-intensive sectors.
Our model could be said to demonstrate a political back…re e¤ect, because the availability of a cleaner technology triggers a change in environmental policy, ultimately resulting in more pollution.
Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the e¤ects of trade liberalization in environmental goods and services (EGS) on a country's domestic eco-…rm, on welfare and on pollution.
Whereas other papers on this subject have assumed that the abatement technology is end-of-pipe, we assume integrated technologies that reduce the emissions-to-output ratio of production.
We have seen that the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the domestic eco-…rm's R&D incentive is ambiguous. The R&D incentive increases with trade if the domestic …rm's existing technology is relatively clean, its bargaining power in autarky is low (so that its R&D incentive under autarky is low), the foreign eco-…rm's existing technology is not too clean and its probability of …nding the new technology is low (so that the domestic …rm's R&D incentive with trade is high). If the domestic …rm does R&D under autarky but not with trade, liberalization may decrease welfare. Thus it may be best for a developing country to …rst liberalize trade in environmental goods with similar countries whose environmental technologies are not too much better than its own. This will stimulate R&D by its domestic eco-industry, increasing welfare and putting the sector in a better position to face competition from more advanced eco…rms at a later date.
We further see that, although trade liberalization means that cleaner technologies become available, it generally leads to an increase in pollution. This is because the government takes the opportunity to increase welfare by reducing the e¤ective tax on polluting output, boosting the downstream …rm's pro…ts and consumer surplus while increasing pollution. While the WTO argues that trade liberalization in EGS will bene…t the environment as well as the consumer, our model sees the consumers bene…t at the expense of the environment. This casts doubt on one of the main motivations for trade liberalization in EGS.
If the eco-industry invented a technology that was much cleaner than the existing technologies, pollution would decline. However, the eco-industry does not have any incentive to undertake R&D into a very clean technology, or even to market it if it is available. This is because when a very clean technology is available, pollution is not a pressing problem anymore and the government will set a negative environmental tax rate to stimulate production. Then the eco-industry would not be able to make any money from its invention.
The problem of negative tax rates is particularly severe in our model, because we have assumed for simplicity that there is just one polluting …rm which would like to produce much less than the welfare-maximizing amount. If the industry were more competitive, there would be less need for negative taxes and more incentive for R&D into cleaner technologies. However, for very clean technologies, the tax rate and the licence fee would still be decreasing in the cleanliness of the technology, discouraging R&D into such cleaner technologies.
We …nd that welfare usually increases with trade liberalization and generally changes in the same direction as pollution. If trade liberalization increases pollution as well as welfare, one might argue that the increase in pollution is nothing to worry about, because environmental damage is just an element of social welfare, which is increasing overall. However, particularly in developing countries, governments might not value the environment enough and the increase in pollution might reduce welfare, especially in the longer run.
Finally, let us re ‡ect on the signi…cance of our assumptions on policy timing, tari¤ revenues and environmental policy instruments.
We have assumed that the domestic government cannot commit to its environmental policy before the eco-…rms make their innovation decision. While one may question whether governments, especially of developing countries, can commit to a policy that is not ex post optimal, let us here explore the commitment scenario. If the government could only commit to a single tax rate, regardless of the eco-…rms' R&D decisions and success, welfare would be lower than in the no-commitment scenario if the …rms undertake R&D and the new technology is much cleaner than the existing ones. If the government could commit to di¤erent tax rates depending on which technologies are available, it would always be able to replicate the no-commitment policies and outcome. The only improvement that commitment can make is on the eco-…rms'R&D decision. The government can now adjust the emission tax rate to increase the …rms' R&D incentive. It will only …nd this worthwhile if R&D costs are just below the level where the eco-…rms would do R&D in the no-commitment scenario. For relatively low and relatively high R&D costs however, the government would not adjust the no-commitment policy, and our analysis carries over to the commitment scenario.
We have assumed that pre-liberalization, tari¤ and/or non-tari¤ barriers are so high that the foreign eco-…rm will not o¤er its technology on the domestic market. However, it could also be possible that the foreign …rm is o¤ering its technology in spite of these barriers, and that the domestic government earns tari¤ revenue from this. The tari¤ then allows the domestic government to capture some of the foreign eco-…rm's rents and may be an important source of government revenue. Indeed, developing countries are concerned about the loss of tari¤ revenue from liberalizing trade in environmental goods and services (UNEP, ITC and ICTSD, 2012). We will leave the issue of tari¤ revenue for future research.
We have assumed that environmental policy consists of an emission tax. However, environmental policy around the world mainly consists of direct regulation or command-and-control. The e¤ects of a relative standard, imposing a maximum emissionto-output ratio, are straightforward. The downstream …rm will only be interested in technologies that meet the standard, selecting from these the technology with the lowest equipment cost. An absolute standard, limiting emissions to a certain …xed amount, requires more analysis. We will also leave this for future research. Free trade. Comparing (19) and (24), we see that q (29) is positive for all values of e j for which the second order condition holds (which implies that the denominator on the RHS of (29) whereê j as a function of e h and is implicitly de…ned by:
The point where the LHS of (A2) switches from +1 to 1 is where In Section 4, we introduced the restriction that the licence fee should be decreasing in
In this appendix, we discuss the conditions under which this is the case.
15 Figure 1 . The domestic …rm' s licence fee F id h under autarky for~ = 1 when the domestic …rm has technology e i ; i = h; n:
B.1 Autarky Figure 1 shows the licence fee F id h (given by (20) ) as a function of e i for di¤erent values of with~ = 1. The condition dF id h =de i < 0 is binding for i = n; because it is clear from Figure 1 that when dF nd h =de n < 0; then dF hd h =de h < 0 as well, since e h > e n . Thus e n should exceed e n ; where e n is de…ned implicitly by:
B.2 Free trade
Domestic …rm has found the new technology. Comparing dF nf h =de n in (25) to dF nd h =de n in (20) with i = n; we see that qualitatively the only di¤erence lies in the less e¢ cient technology 2 which has e f < 1 in scenario nf and e = 1 in nd: At e n as de…ned by (B1) we must have dt nd =de n > 0 by (13) . Then since emissions with the less e¢ cient technology E 2 are lower in scenario nf than in nd; dF nf h ( e n )=de n < 0 and dF nf h =de n = 0 occurs at an e n < e n . Domestic …rm has not found the new technology. It can be shown that F jh f in (30); j = n; f; is …rst increasing and then decreasing in e j : Then the condition dF jh f =de j < 0 is binding for j = n; since when dF nh f =de n < 0; then dF f h h =de f < 0 as well, since e f > e n . Thus e n should exceedẽ n ; whereẽ n is de…ned implicitly by:
It can be shown thatẽ n (e h ) is an increasing function of e h . 15 Further details are available from the corresponding author upon request. Note: e n de…ned by (B1),ẽ n by (B2).
B.3 Conclusion
We have found two minimum values of e n : e n in (B1) does not depend on e h ; whileẽ n in (B2) is increasing in e h : This means that for low values of e h ; the binding constraint is e n > e n ; while for higher values of e h it is e n >ẽ n : Table 2 shows how the minimum e n value changes with e h for selected values of : With = 3; for instance, e n = 0:708 whileẽ n = 0:708 for e h = 0:779: Thus for 0:708 < e h < 0:779; the binding constraint is e n > e n = 0:708: For e h > 0:779; the binding constraint is e n >ẽ n ; withẽ n increasing in e h : For the maximum value of one for e h ;ẽ n = 0:807: For the values of 3 and 5, the maximum value of e h is one, whereas for higher 's it is constrained by (A5).
C Appendix C: Proofs C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us …rst collect the expressions for welfare. Substituting (17) and (19) into (16) yields welfare in scenario id; i = h; n:
Substituting (22) and (23) into (21) gives welfare in scenarios nn and nf as:
Substituting (27) and (29) into (26) gives welfare in scenario jh; j = f; n; as: 
The sign of dW jh =de j in (C4) is the sign of the numerator on the RHS. De…ning a e j =e h ; b e 2 j ; the sign of the numerator is the sign of:
has a maximum in b for: Proof. From (C2) and (25):
e f e 2 n + e n + e f ) 2 4e 2 n ( e 2 n + 1)
Di¤erentiating (C7) with respect to e n , we obtain:
where a e n =e f ; b e For b > 3; the maximum value of in (C9) occurs at:
Substituting this into (C9), the highest possible value of is:
We see that a > 0 and < 0 for b 2 3; 2 + p 5 and a < 0 and > 0 for b 2 2 + p 5; interior maximum (a > 0), is negative. We conclude that is negative so that the RHS of (C8) is negative. The lowest possible value of (W nf F nf h ) is thus achieved at the maximum value of e n ; which is e f : Setting e n = e f in (C7), we …nd from (C1):
The inequality follows from (4) and e f < e h :
We will now prove Proposition 1 by examining each possible combination of R&D decisions in turn. 
The …rst inequality follows from C h < C The inequality follows from Lemma 1.
17 W XY and W X denote expected welfare under trade and autarky, respectively, with X (Y ) the R&D choice of the domestic (foreign) …rm. X; Y = R; N where R (N ) means (no) R&D. The same notation is used for D in Section C.2.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us …rst collect the expressions for emissions. Emissions in each scenario are given by e 1 q 1 : Thus in scenario id; i = h; n; we have from (19) :
In scenarios nf and nn; emissions are, from (23):
n + 1
In scenario jh; j = f; n; emissions are, from (29):
e j e j e h + e 
Before turning to the Proposition, we …rst establish:
Lemma 3 When the domestic …rm has not found the new technology, emissions are higher with free trade than under autarky: E jh > E hd with j = f; n:
Proof. From (C10) and (C12) it is clear that E jh = E hd for e j = e h : From (C12): 
By Lemma 3, a su¢ cient condition for D N R > D R is (41).
C.2.6 R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are E nd if R&D is successful and E hd if it is not. With trade, emissions are E nn = E nf = E nd if the domestic …rm's R&D is successful and E jh ; j = f; n; if it is not. Thus we have: D
